ABSTRACT

Introduction Taming security forces through constitutional reform has been a major challenge for young democracies of Southeast Asia. In some cases. security sector reform has been successful, with certain studies predicting a bright future for the region (Beeson and Bellamy 2008). In other cases, governments seeking to establish or consolidate civilian control have been faced with coups d’état or the threat of coups. On other occasions, the successful enshrinement of laws regulating security forces has accompanied compromises which provide militaries/police with considerable latitude in areas of decision-making. Ultimately, this study examines three country cases of young democracies where security forces have evolved toward becoming more integrated under the constitutional charters of civilian-led regimes. Yet, such moves have not led to civilianization but have instead mostly camouflaged continuing khaki clout – insulating security forces from civilian monitoring. As such, the study asks four questions with regard to each of the cases. First, how did the institutionalization of security services under civilian-led constitutions historically occur? Second, how did these experiences vary? Third, to what extent do security forces in different countries today possess differing degrees of enshrined powers? Based on these experiences, how might the constitutionalization of “true” civilian control eventually become sustained? Using a variant of historical institutionalism, the study argues that constitutional change acceded to by security forces results more often than not from sequences of transformative bargains – informal negotiations and concessions – between civilians and security officials.