ABSTRACT
The debate on the place of religious minorities within the nation-state had already begun prior to Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s national independence. In both countries, the resulting formulas were not fully laical and liberal, but so broadly worded that religious minorities did not feel overly marginalized. In both countries this has changed over time. In Indonesia, the attempt to introduce the Jakarta Charter (“with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow syari’ah”) in the constitution utterly failed in 2002, but since then Islamists have made minor encroachments on the rights of religious minorities with the passage of certain laws, (inter-ministerial) decrees and local regulations, and by creating an atmosphere of intolerance, hate, and anguish. They are obviously attempting to redefine the role of Islam and other religions. In Malaysia, this contestation has also been present from the beginning. Islam was declared the religion of the state, but in a circumscribed form. A subsequent Islamization process, not unlike that in Indonesia, gradually rendered religious and ethnic minorities more and more vulnerable, peaking in 2001 when Prime Minister Mahathir claimed that Malaysia was an Islamic state, at a time when the rivalry of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) with the Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PanMalaysian Islamic Party (PAS)) had reached its apex. The legal position of minorities has also been impaired incrementally, but the debate over the constitutional and legal place of Islam, the privileges of Malays (as bumiputeras),2 the status of shari’a courts, etc. has intensified in recent years. This is demonstrated, for example, by the rise of new civil society organizations established by religious minorities and Malay Muslims, all of which are able to mobilize large numbers of discontented supporters. Another indicator is the marked increase in legal cases regarding custody rights, apostasy, blasphemy, etc. (Freedom House 2010). This chapter aims to uncover some of the situational and configurational political factors behind this increasing pressure on religious (and ethnic) minorities.3 It argues that the explanation for the deterioration of religious minority rights is fourfold. First, in both countries, one of the central political contests is focused on the question of religion and its legal and constitutional position. Second, in order to hold their fragile coalitions of parties together, the pragmatically (or opportunistically) oriented executive heads have tried to take centrist positions, but in reality they have often given in to radicals. Third, in Malaysia, political parties politicized religious issues less intensively than in the past because PAS has toned down its Islamist agenda due to its position as a partner in the multi-religious and multi-ethnic opposition coalition;4 in Indonesia, Islamist parties have increasingly shifted toward centerist positions. And fourth, because the political parties are somewhat more restrained in politicizing religion, rogue groups in tandem with a strengthened religious bureaucracy are playing an important role in determining the political agenda, in threatening minorities, and in creating an illiberal atmosphere.
