ABSTRACT
Although the coherence of supposing that a person could ever be better off dead has sometimes been questioned on metaphysical grounds, I argue in favour of the common intuition that in some circumstances death could be better for a person than continued life. I proceed to defend three conclusions: (a) that generalisations about when a person may be better off dead are elusive, the answers being personal and existential and affected by how individuals see the world and their place within it; (b) that the question of whether it would be better for a person to die than live arises not only in medical contexts, where she may be suffering severe physical or mental distress or disability, but also in situations in which the prospect of prolonged life is unattractive because living longer would be incompatible with her values; and (c) that because judgements as to whether further life would be worth living are heavily dependent on the subject’s value commitments, criticism from an alternative value-standpoint of a person’s judgement that she would be better off dead is unlikely to change her mind and may beg the question against her.
