ABSTRACT
The Representational View holds that perceptual experience fundamentally consists in the subject representing her environment as being a certain way. A common worry about physicalism is that there is an "explanatory gap" between physical states of the brain and phenomenal consciousness—including the sort associated with perceptual experiences in particular. The chapter presents the idea from realist primitivism and assess whether it enables philosophers to make good on the hunch that perceptual experience isn't just representational. To summarise—the Extended View can explain why it's like this to see greenness only if perceiving an instance of greenness is sufficient for acquaintance with its nature, and this is so only if realist primitivism is true. The suggestion earlier was that one has perceptual insight into the intrinsic nature of F-ness to the extent that phenomenal F-ness resembles F-ness itself. It is compatible with this claim that the extent to which phenomenal F-ness resembles F-ness itself is extremely minimal in some cases.
