ABSTRACT
This chapter sheds analytical light on dispute resolution mechanisms offered by armed non-state actors filling a state void caused by highly inaccesible and inefficient public court systems. It focuses on disputes among at risk rural households using data collected during previous law and economics of development research. The chapter explains the logic behind informal dispute resolution provided by non-state armed groups, or to state it differently why the latter find incentives in taking on such a task. The poorest segments of the population are marginalized in the formal justice system and court-linked mediation and arbitration mechanisms, they show greater demand for informal non-state actors. Many judiciaries suffer from a chronic lack of quality, transparency, and impartiality in their rulings resulting from endemic corruption. Paradoxically, "weak" or "inefficient" states may stay afloat because of such "services". And this could represent a source of institutional inertia blocking much-needed judicial reforms.
