ABSTRACT
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) makes clear in guidance to host cities that it is their responsibility to provide a safe environment for the ‘Olympic Family’ (competitors, officials and dignitaries), while ensuring that such securitization does not get in the way of the sporting activities or spirit of the Games. As Thompson (1999, p. 106) observed, ‘the IOC has made clear that the Olympics are an international sporting event, not an international security event, and while Olympic security must be comprehensive it must also be unobtrusive’. However, since 2001, given the escalation and changing nature of the terrorist threat, ‘securing’ the Olympics is increasingly difficult and costly to achieve (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). As has been well documented, the results of increased fears of international terrorism catalysed by the events of 11 September 2001 have meant that the cost of security operations surrounding the Summer Olympic Games in particular have increased dramatically since the 2004 Games in Athens (Coaffee and Johnston, 2007). A large proportion of this increased cost is attributable to extra security personnel as well as an array of temporary security measures, especially those which are effective at stopping or minimizing the impact of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (Coaffee, 2009). For most Olympic organizers, preparations for the Games necessarily include attempts to equate spectacle with safety and to design-out terrorism, often by relying on highly militarized tactics and expensive and detailed contingency planning.
