ABSTRACT
Adam Smith, with his friend David Hume, is one of the great critics of the social contract. In traditional histories of political and ethical philosophy, Hume and Smith are the beginning of a move away from contract theory and the early development of what would become the rival tradition of utilitarianism.1 Most political philosophers continue to hold this view.2 Despite the vintage of this historical narrative, I argue that it has led to a basic misunderstanding inAdam Smith’s account of justice. By using the techniques of contemporary contract theory, we can plausibly and profitably interpret Smith as a special kind of contractarian. In so doing, we can helpfully distinguish the notion of impartiality found in Smith from the impartiality of later utilitarians like Henry Sidgwick and contemporary theorists like Amartya Sen and Brian Barry.3 Indeed, Brian Barry’s distinction between justice as impartiality and justice as mutual advantage is central to the claim being made here. Ultimately, I argue that Smith is best understood as a mutual advantage theorist.4
