ABSTRACT
In this chapter I consider whether chess still serves as a simulacrum for political and military confrontation. While clearly a metaphor of the highest degree, it embodies a conception of a very particular type of conflict and, moreover, a conception that holds a great deal of significance for our moral and strategic assessment of cyber and unmanned warfare. When we think of chess, we imagine equally configured forces ready to engage in a perfectly symmetrical contest. Each side has clear and distinguishable uniforms. The battle is regulated by robust rules that stipulate how the conflict is to be commenced, conducted and terminated. As David Rodin (2006, p. 153) argued in his exploration of the ethics of asymmetric conflict, this image reflects a moral assessment of conflict in two ways: first, it gives us the idea of war as a fair fight between two combatants; second, because the battle is isolated from all non-combatant elements, it accords with our sense of justice in war by limiting the risk of harm to those directly involved in the conflict. However, as he also points out, there are forms of war that do not embody the sort of symmetry and equality that characterise the contest that is chess (Rodin 2006, p. 153). As modern history confirms, war all too often diverges from the chessboard image of war, and it is the argument of the first section of this chapter that when the degree of divergence reaches a critical point, we begin to experience serious difficulties in interpreting and applying Just War theory. More specifically, it will be argued that distance warfare deployed by technologically powerful states can generate a morally problematic ‘radical asymmetry’ that sets justice and fairness in conflict or competition with the initial aims of those that aim such wars. In the second section of this chapter, I consider the implications of warfare departing from the sort of transparency that is implicit in the game of chess and earlier forms of conflict. In particular, I suggest that the causal chains that we typically rely upon to attribute responsibility are 159obscured by the ones and zeros of digital computing and that as defence becomes increasingly computerised and automated, we may need to think more carefully about the implications this has for relations between armed forces.
