Biodiversity

Twenty-five years ago, biodiversity was not a central concern of biologists or ecosystems theorists (Tilman 2000). Nonetheless, a significant number of books and papers by biologists and philosophers were sounding a warning about the loss of species, the possible impact of such losses on ecosystem functions and the reduction in value – both moral and economic – that was likely as a consequence of the reduction in natural variety (Norton 1986, 1987; E. O. Wilson 1992). These writers emphasized that biodiversity encompassed a number of different levels. In E. O. Wilson’s view, there were at least three different levels of natural variety that were worth preserving: first, the variety of alleles (gene variants within individuals); second, the variety of species themselves; and finally, the range of varied ecosystems found across the surface of the planet and within its caverns, rivers, lakes and oceans. In his 1987 book, Bryan G. Norton emphasized a number of features that have since come to prominence in writing on biodiversity. First, a case – but not necessarily a strong one – for preserving the current variety of species can be built on the utility they have – whether actually or potentially – for human beings, rather than because of any deeper value they may have in their own right. If the value of systems, plants and animals is viewed solely in terms of what economists call “demand values” – those features for which we have preferences in light of the pleasure, utility and other benefits and services they provide to us – then the value of biodiversity is in theory measurable by various techniques (such as surveys of consumer preferences, willingness to pay to protect areas of diversity, estimating the expenditures people make to visit areas of biodiversity, and so on). Given our limited knowledge, such attributed economic values may well underestimate the full economic value of many species, and any noneconomic values they may have (Sagoff 1988, O’Neill et al. 2008). Second, Norton argued that the best way to preserve natural variety was through preserva-

tion of habitats. Unlike this relatively uncontroversial point, a third component of his argument was, and remains, more controversial. Norton claimed that by leaving wild nature alone and encouraging humans to have appropriate interactions with natural species, there was a prospect for a transformation of values: “experiences of wild species have value because they play a positive role in transforming less acceptable into more acceptable values” (Norton 1987: 237). Such transformation would affect not only the individual preferences a person has, but even the person’s ordering among such preferences. Some might argue that in the twenty-five years since

the publication of Norton’s work, values have already undergone some level of transformation, as evidenced by the fact that concern for biodiversity, wilderness places, and for ecosystem health, flourishing and prosperity is now much more widespread than it was and is, at least nominally, a central plank of much government and corporate planning and policy worldwide. Further, the rising popularity of rewilding movements testifies to the idea that experiences of wild nature may be able to transform values and develop our characters in a multitude of ways (C. Fraser 2009, Monbiot 2013). One factor in the emergence of the greater interest in biodiversity was probably the con-

silience between the work of scientists and philosophers just mentioned, and the publication in 1992 of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. This document was finalized in May 1992, in time to be launched at the Rio Summit in June of that year, and finally brought into force in December 1993 (Convention on Biological Diversity 1992). The preamble to the document refers explicitly both to the utility of nature, and also to its intrinsic value. The contracting parties, it explains, are conscious “of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components”. They are also “conscious of the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining systems of the biosphere” (ibid.: 1). The convention has set the context for a range of initiatives associated both with protecting

biodiversity for its own sake, and also seeking to ensure that the components of biodiversity are used in a sustainable way. The involvement of biological scientists with national and international policy-making has been aided by the emergence of conservation biology as an academic field of study focusing on the preservation of biodiversity. As a result, reports on the state of the planet’s biodiversity are now a central feature of science inputs to policy at high levels and of reporting in the leading science journals (see for example Butchart et al. 2010). A further central ambition of the convention was that the benefits arising from use of the

planet’s genetic resources should be shared equitably and fairly across the globe. Such initiatives and ambitions are also endorsed by the independently sponsored Earth Charter, launched in June 2000, the first principle of which calls for respect for life in all its diversity. Like the convention, the charter also calls for social justice to be combined with care for biodiversity and natural processes, thus aiming simultaneously to protect the intrinsic values of nature and diversity, and also ensure that environmental goods and services are made available to all without bias or discrimination (Earth Charter Commission 2000). As a civil society initiative, the charter has been endorsed by thousands of individuals and organizations, including UNESCO. By contrast, the biodiversity convention is for ratification by states and federations of states, such as the European Union. Two notable abstentions from ratification of the convention to date are the USA and the Holy See. Some have seen both the convention and the charter as documents whose aspirations and

demands are best located within a universal or global ethic, hence providing philosophers and other ethical theorists the opportunity to explore the prospects for global ethics. Since both documents recognize the value of human cultural, linguistic and social diversity, their appeal to a universal convergence of values is not meant to suggest that one ethic will be appropriate for everyone everywhere (Dower 2005). Rather, the documents can be seen as embodying values that are shared by different individuals, groups and nation states, independent of the variety of different social, ethical and religious perspectives that characterize their underlying worldviews. But what shared values might these be? There are clearly many goods derived from nature ranging from the pleasure and excitement derived from studies of various parts of nature and communicated through nature documentaries all the way through to the extraction and

conversion of natural resources for human benefit. One key idea that can unite different perspectives on natural values is based on an appeal to preserving future opportunities for the enjoyment of such goods. As Norton has put it, very different human groups, with widely varying perspectives, can perhaps “accept responsibility to maintain a non-declining set of opportunities based on possible uses of the environment”. The preservation of options for the future can be readily linked to notions of equity in the way we approach sustainability so that “the future ought not to face, as a result of our actions today, a seriously reduced range of options and choices, as they try to adapt to the environment that they face” (Norton 2002: 419). A further reason for thinking of biodiversity in global rather than national or regional terms is

that species loss is often caused by, and will in turn affect, different groups of people and different nations in a multitude of different but interconnected ways. Both the causes and the results of species loss are dispersed in space and in time. Climate change that leads to species loss is a good example of such dispersal. Once greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere, they can have effects geographically far away from their source. Since the gases persist for many hundreds of years in the atmosphere, they also have effects remote in time from when they were produced (Gardiner 2011). Moreover, since rich people, with the highest consumption patterns, are themselves dispersed over many different countries, per capita responsibility for CO2 emissions is not evenly correlated with the relative affluence of particular countries. In nation states with high levels of social and economic inequality and low levels of social welfare, the effects of ecosystem degradation and species loss caused by climate change are likely to have the highest impact on those who are less well off. In consequence, just as the preservation of nature and natural systems poses a global problem, so do questions about mitigation and justice for individuals and communities affected by environmental decline (Jamieson 2010).