ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the relations among contextualism, skepticism, and different construals of "fallibilism", and distinguishes between two contextualist ways of handling "infallibilist tensions", presenting them along with other, non-contextualist options for dealing with those tensions. Contextualism in epistemology has been intimately related to fallibilism, though, due to some malleability in what is meant by "fallibilism", that relation has been presented in different ways. "Intuitive fallibilism" can then be the position that knowing some fact is compatible with being fallible with respect to that fact in the murky-but-intuitive sense in question. The fallibilism that David Lewis thinks sounds like "madness" is GC-fallibilism. The chapter suggests the hope that the sense in which "knowledge" is incompatible with one's being fallible with respect to the item "known" can be used to explain (away) the phenomena that seem to support infallibilism.
