ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a critical overview of how some contextualists in epistemology have approached lottery and preface scenarios. Contextualists concerned with knowledge ascriptions are broadly committed to a theory on which the truth-conditions of "know(s) that" are sensitive to the context in which it is used. Contextualists in epistemology offer an initially compelling explanation of the set of judgments, including those involving lotteries, while upholding a principle of closure. For even in situations where lottery-like odds seem to be far from relevant, the contextualist will allow that an ascriber can truthfully ascribe knowledge to a subject, and that ascriber can presumably conjoin given multi-premise closure (MPC) with other knowledge that the ascriber may claim for the subject. David Lewis claims that a contextualist who endorses a semantics given by ascriber contextualism (AC) along with Lewis's rules has an apt explanation of why.
