ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the view that knowledge is interest-relative, but contextualism is false. There are two primary motivations for interest-relative invariantism (IRI). One comes from intuitions about cases, the other from a pair of principles. If the motivation for IRI came from cases, then it is natural to believe Stakes. But if the motivation for IRI came from principles, then it is natural to believe Odds. Jessica Brown notes that cases where the agent faces long odds but low stakes raise problems for the stakes-based version of IRI. While the non-global version of IRI allows for some nice reductive explanations of why interests matter, the global version is supported by the very intuitions that motivated IRI. The weaker principle is that IRI makes knowledge counterfactually sensitive to features irrelevant to the truth, justification, or reliability of the belief. Many arguments against IRI are, in effect, debunking arguments.
