ABSTRACT
Relativists about knowledge ascriptions think that whether a particular use of a knowledge-ascribing sentence, example, "Keith DeRose knows that the bank is open", is true depends on the epistemic standards at play in the assessor's context – viz., the context in which the knowledge ascription is being assessed for truth or falsity. Traditionally, the term "epistemic relativism" has been used to pick out a wide class of philosophical positions. This chapter outlines the key features of "new" epistemic relativism, after which the implications for the view in epistemological theory will be canvassed. The epistemological "bleed over" from an assessment-sensitive semantics for "knows" to other epistemic notions connected to knowledge is not limited to equivalence relations. The chapter considers the implications for an assessment-sensitive semantics for "knows" within the context of epistemological debates about epistemic norms and epistemic value.
