ABSTRACT
Epistemic Contextualism is the view that "knows that" is semantically context-sensitive and that properly accommodating this fact into the philosophical theory promises to solve various puzzles concerning knowledge. Yet Epistemic Contextualism faces a big – some would say fatal – problem: The Semantic Error Problem. Ambitious Contextualism, meanwhile, deploys the insights gained from Modest Contextualism to resolve a range of puzzles concerning knowledge, such as Cartesian Scepticism, lottery scepticism, the dogmatism paradox and the puzzle of easy knowledge. One immediate response is to concede that the requisite global error is indeed unprecedented but deny this makes the required error attribution implausible. The chapter discusses the Schiffer's original error cases against Contextualism, as it already prefigures most of the strands of error objections levelled against Contextualism. Self-relativism's objections can be understood as challenges to the semantic view rather than knock-down objections.
