ABSTRACT
It is by them (our perceptions) also that we think. (Epicurus in Cicero’s De Finibus, I. 6)
The role of sensory-motor representations for conceptual cognition in ancient philosophy and modern cognitive sciences
Belief in the inf luence of the physical body and its perceptuomotor systems on psychological and cognitive processes is historically promiscuous. The idea that thought is supported by imagery and modal/perceptual representations may be traced to the discourse of philosophers as far back as the pre-Christian era 300 BC (see Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Machery, 2007). Epicurus (341-270 BC ) understood the automatic regeneration of perceptual images (those initially experienced as sensory input) as a fundamental process in human cognition. Jump forward two millennia, and the nature of human thought was still an issue of contention in the battle of rationalism and empiricism, with members of the latter camp arguing the essential sameness of “percepts” and “concepts.” Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753) and Hume (1711-1776) all emphasised the shaping of human thought by perceptual experience, but their remarks were to sink into obscurity.
