ABSTRACT
This contribution examines the role of European Uion (EU) financial industry groups in global financial governance. I examine the extent to which EU-based financial industry groups are able to have their preferences met at different stages in the making of three different global banking regulatory policies which were part of the Basel III reforms. I find significant variation in their level of success – not across policies but across levels of governance. Specifically I find that the ability of these groups to affect either the global policy agenda or the specific content of new regulatory rules has been inconsistent and often quite weak, despite considerable structural power resources at their disposal and concerted advocacy campaigns. Where these groups have been more successful is in addressing the implementation phase, specifically EU-level implementation of these global regulatory policies. Such findings have implications not only for how we understand the power of EU financial industry groups in global governance generally, but also for more specific theoretical interventions on the role of market size, regulatory centralization and the structural power of firms.
