ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a critique and develops an alternative to the philosophical model of mind that frames much of such educational neuroscience, namely, a representational theory of mind correlated with a computational understanding of the brain. It problematizes representationalism and its computational cognate, arguing that educational neuroscience must move beyond the representationalist model. The chapter then offers educational neuroscience another model of mind, one based in recent interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's idea of bodily subjectivity. There is an argument that educational neuroscience needs to get beyond a representational model of mind. Educational neuroscience might research how the learning brain is part of the bodily subjects learning activities, including the hands that reach and grasp, the eyes that focus, the upright postures freeing hands and locating eyes, and so forth. The chapter suggested that the brain is best understood in the context of bodily subjectivity, embedded in a world. This is fundamentally a relational, dynamic construal of mental life, cognition, and learning.
