ABSTRACT
The crisis of representative democracy in Latin America became apparent in a wave of constitutional reforms during the 1990s. A striking feature of these reforms was the incorporation of institutions of direct democracy (IDD) into most post-transitional Latin American constitutions. Despite the shortage of efficient mechanisms of accountability and its concomitant weakening of democratic consolidation in the region, the potential of IDD to bolster accountability in the representative structures of presidential democracies has not yet received systematic scholarly attention. To fill this theoretical gap, the article presents a typology designed to assess the accountability potential of IDD, which is used to classify the constitutional provisions for direct democracy in Latin America’s 18 presidential democracies. After juxtaposing the findings of constitutional analysis to the actual record of direct democracy in the region, the article concludes that there is a considerable discrepancy between constitutional accountability potential and the empirical evidence. Whereas the adoption of IDD has hardly affected the vertical dimension of accountability, the practice whereby presidents use referendums to bypass legislative opposition has worked to the detriment of the horizontal dimension of accountability.
