ABSTRACT
Introduction Although coalitions are considered the lifeblood of parliamentary systems, a developing literature attests to their ubiquity in presidential systems as well. In turn, cabinet-sharing arrangements in presidential systems have the potential to enhance representation, accountability and governability (Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004). Chile testifi es to this reality. Since returning to democracy in 1990 after a 17-year dictatorship, Chile has been governed by multiparty coalitions where cabinet composition has been central not just to these key aspects of democracy but also to underwriting one of the most successful democratic transitions in Latin America. The centre-left Concertación coalition governed for the fi rst 20 of these years, relying on the distribution of ministerial portfolios to build and maintain a multiparty coalition, while the centre-right Alianza has relied on a similar formula, albeit with only two major parties and a smattering of independents in the cabinet. Although this cabinet sharing has been analysed, we still know relatively little about the concrete process of ministerial selection and de-selection in Chile during Concertación governments. This chapter helps fi ll that gap, offering both insights into the process in Chile and a more general contribution regarding the key interplay between the formal and informal aspects of ministerial selection and de-selection in presidential systems.
