ABSTRACT
Moral realism is the view that moral claims such as "Rape is morally wrong" report facts and are true if they get the facts right, and that at least some moral claims are actually true. Driver's feminist constructivism also purports to avoid a feminist worry about moral relativism which is that culturally relative truth might entrench oppressive norms. Most of the feminist debate about truth in ethics has not been about the nature of moral facts, but about whether feminists should endorse moral absolutism or moral relativism. While moral relativists believe that truth in ethics is relative to cultures or even individuals, moral absolutists believe that there is one true moral code. Feminists have raised a number of challenges to the project of defeating the practical skeptic. One objection is whether the expected theory of utility, or rational choice theory, is compatible with feminism, since if it is not, it is a poor starting point for attempting to defeat skepticism.
