ABSTRACT
There is a standard understanding of Thomas Reid’s views regarding the will and action according to which Reid defends both a libertarian account of free will and an agent causal theory of action. While the standard understanding of Reid’s views is probably correct, puzzles emerge when one digs deeper into what Reid says when he develops these views. In this chapter, we address three interpretive challenges that face those who wish to understand what Reid says about will and action, namely:
The Action Challenge : Reid claims that some of our actions are free. But what behaviors belong to the category action ? Reid seems to say different things on this issue. In some places, he endorses a broad view according to which events, such as throwing baseballs, count as actions. In other places, he embraces a narrow view according to which only certain kinds of mental events count as actions. The issue presents a challenge to Reid’s interpreters because how one answers it determines whether Reid’s position is subject to familiar Frankfurt-style counterexamples. (See Frankfurt [1969] and Sartorio in the present volume [Chapter 15] for a discussion of these examples.)
The Motive Challenge : Reid claims that actions are ordinarily taken on the basis of motives. But Reid also endorses two accounts of motives that appear incompatible-one of which seems to t better with his account of free action, the other of which seems to mesh better with broadly common sense views about the motivational roles of mental states such as desires. The fact that Reid works with two different accounts of motives presents a challenge to Reid’s interpreters because neither account of motives seems to t well with Reid’s commitments.
