ABSTRACT
The problem of free will has many faces. When we have to make a decision, we usually think that in the end the decision is ‘up to us.’ We think we are basically free to choose and that we have ‘free will.’ We usually don’t think our choice is predetermined by the past. But the classical natural sciences (roughly until the end of the nineteenth century) usually assume that everything that happens is determined by the past. They say that if we knew the physical states now, together with the laws of nature, and if we had enough computing power, we could do some calculation and in principle predict what will happen tomorrow. We could predict the movement of the stars, the weather, and anyone’s choice. This idea is called Laplacian determinism. Thus, there is a tension between our idea of freedom and this kind of determinism. Furthermore, even if determinism is not true, it is dif cult to give an account of how free will works, because it is dif cult, or even impossible, to establish a middle position between chance and determinism. This also applies to our present time, in which classical physics has been superseded by quantum physics and certain indeterminacies have entered the game. Investigating these problems leads to issues about agency, responsibility, personal identity, causality, time, and many other topics. Such topics were rst investigated by the Ancient Greeks and the Stoics and further developed under the in uence of Christianity (the idea of God who gave us free will, including the ability to do evil) and the modern sciences.
