ABSTRACT
The Addict is a central character in the contemporary free will debate. Classic compatibilism holds that freedom consists in the absence of more or less common external constraints on actions, such as threats or coercion by others, the use of physical force or restrictions, paralysis or disability, and the lack of choices and opportunities. Incompatibilism contends that freedom of action is not the same as freedom of will. Absence of external constraints does not guarantee that we have free will, understood as a distinctive (if dif cult to analyze) power to do otherwise: freedom requires that we be able to choose, for ourselves, whether to act in a certain way or not, so that we ourselves and nothing else determine what we do and decide our futures. There is a dramatic standoff. From the incompatibilist perspective, classic compatibilism gives us a severely limited account of the nature of freedom. From the classic compatibilist perspective, the free will trumpeted by incompatibilism may be little more than a chimera. At this point in the debate, enter The Addict. In response to the stand-off, contemporary compatibilism concedes to incompatibilism that the absence of external constraints is not enough for freedom of will as opposed to freedom of action. There must also be an absence of internal constraints, namely, the compulsion characteristic of mental disorder in general, and of addiction in particular. Free will, as opposed to free action, is what those of us who are not addicts purportedly have, and what The Addict purportedly lacks. It is a form of freedom worth wanting: addiction is a devastating condition that destroys lives. And it is a form of freedom compatible with determinism: whether or not determinism is true, we are able to choose what we do in a way that The Addict cannot.
