ABSTRACT
Experimental philosophy is a relatively new approach to philosophy that uses some methods of behavioral science to help illuminate some philosophical issues (Feltz 2009; Knobe et al. 2012; Cova and Kitano 2014). 1 One prominent area of experimental philosophy involves exploring ‘folk intuitions’ about the ‘compatibility question’ (Kane 1996; Sommers 2010). 2 The compatibility question asks ‘Is free will and moral responsibility compatible with determinism?’ Compatibilists give an af rmative answer whereas incompatibilists give a negative answer. A widely accepted philosophical answer remains elusive and perhaps is not likely forthcoming (Feltz and Cokely 2012). However, one commonly held assumption is that folk intuitions are important evidence for the correct answer (Nahmias et al. 2004, 2005, 2006b; Sommers 2010). A descriptive understanding of folk intuitions does not necessarily solve any theoretical or practical issues. However, a descriptive understanding can put constraints on theories (Gigerenzer 2008). At a minimum, a theory or conceptual analysis of freedom and moral responsibility that is contrary to folk intuitions has an obligation to explain why those intuitions are mistaken-a burden that theories or analyses that are consistent with folk intuitions do not shoulder (Nahmias et al. 2006b). Philosophical theories that postulate conditions for freedom and moral responsibility that are uninformed by the way humans actually are is likely to result in ‘philosophical ctions’ (Mele 2001). In this spirit, this chapter reviews folk intuitions about the compatibility question from two different approaches. The rst section reviews direct assessments of the compatibility question and the second section reviews indirect assessments of the compatibility question.
