ABSTRACT
Three key questions arise from the encroachment of the European Union (EU) on national prerogatives in the administration of justice: What factors contribute to the weakest link collective action problem attending police and judicial cooperation within the EU? What were the substantive and institutional goals of the EU in this policy domain? What accounts for the rising level of police and judicial cooperation despite the persistence of barriers to cooperation and incentives to defect? This article first establishes the fundamental incentives and obstacles to cooperation in matters of transnational security threats in post-Westphalian Europe. It then proceeds to explore the evolution of police and judicial cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs between 1999 and 2009, to assess national contributions to police and judicial cooperation, and to consider the potential impact that the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, Stockholm Programme and European Investigation Order. A final question is considered in the conclusion: Did the level and extent of police and judicial cooperation that emerged between 1999 and 2009 give rise to a community of practice that in turn fostered a nascent community of identity resilient enough to mitigate the weakest link technology of public goods production endemic to this policy domain?
