ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the issues of selfhood and subjectivity from the double perspective of pragmatism and transcendental philosophy, seeking to respond to the challenge of integrating naturalism and anti-reductionism in attempts to understand the human self and its relation to the world. This is a challenge equally for the philosophy of mind and for metaphysics, as well as many related fields of philosophical inquiry. Panpsychism is by no means a mainstream option in general metaphysics or the philosophy of mind today however, it does have its advocates, and it enjoys some plausibility in comparison to some other attempted solutions. The main novelty of pragmatist philosophy of subjectivity might be, indeed, that this dialogue should not be based upon prior metaphysically realist presuppositions, according to which there either just is, or is not, emergent subjectivity "out there" in the world independently of us, conceived "absolutely", or from an imagined "God's-Eye View".
