ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that there are many good reasons to include Peirce not only in Kant's direct filiations however, in particular in the framework of transcendental philosophy. Here "transcendental" means relating to conditions of possibility. Peirce was consistently looking for conditions of possibility of knowledge from the beginning of his philosophical career until the 1880s at least. Peirce's cosmological project in the late 1880s forced him to give up the project of transcendental foundations. The foundational perspective of science, quite at odds with Kant's transcendental approach, that Peirce investigated the conditions of the possibility of reasoning in general, and of induction in particular. Peirce focused on induction in order to apply his analysis of reasoning to the problem of the truth of our representations of the world. For Peirce, induction is the key to the problem of synthetic judgments in general, which best encapsulates the transcendental problem.
