ABSTRACT
The word 'teleology' invokes ideas of intentional design or purpose, and mainstream contemporary biologists do not believe that organic systems result from intentional design or purpose, setting aside special cases of domestic breeding and genetic engineering and the like. In contrast, ordinary causal explanations cite preceding causes, or maybe phenomena occurring at the same time as what is explained. Teleological explanations in contemporary biology are prima facie more problematic. A teleonomic function is like a teleological function of an artifact, except it is (as a matter of stipulation) mind independent in the way naturalism requires. The understanding of teleonomy in biology is supported by etiological theories of function. Proponents of other theories of function also claim that their theories can account for or allow for the teleological flavor of function ascriptions in contemporary biology. The kind of functional explanation ascribes a function to something to answer a why-question concerning its origin, presence, or persistence.
