ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to spell out some major but long-misunderstood propositions of Bentham's theory of law by examining Hart's famous paper 'Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons' in the light of Bentham's own texts. To understand these features, Hart argues, the notion of a peremptory reason for action must be introduced: this notion is to Hart's jurisprudence what the command is to Bentham's. This is exactly the point of his essay 'Commands and Authoritative Reasons', the purpose of which is to establish that 'the notion of a peremptory reason for action is required for the understanding of legal authority and law-making'. It demonstrates that Bentham's notion of a command does not contain in it the germ of Hart's of a peremptory reason for action, and that the latter would make no sense to Bentham. The chapter shows what Bentham would think of Hart's so-called 'distinctive normative attitude', and discuss the way in which Bentham would understand the normativity of law.
