ABSTRACT
In August and September 2010 the Prism Cell of HQ RC-South invited me to spend some time with them in Kandahar and also at ISAF HQ in Kabul looking at the campaign’s strategic communications and information operations. It was impossible not to be impressed by the quality and industriousness of the people involved. About two-thirds of the way through the visit I recorded in my diary “I find I cannot help walking away from meetings with some people here who are so clever and committed that I think ‘Man, this could really work.’ ” (Betz 2010). Inevitably, though, the “contact high” would wear off and the sheer improbability of the adventure’s ultimate success would reassert itself in my mind. In my final report I wrote that ISAF had failed to communicate,
a message of purpose which answers the oft-asked “why are we there?” question amongst Western audiences; a message of resolve on which Afghans can bet their lives that ISAF will remain there until the Taliban is beaten or compelled to reasonable compromise; and, a message of what success will look like which is accompanied by a compelling rationalization of the cost.
