ABSTRACT
Despite significant domestic opposition, the government of Canada chose to sustain a sizable military contribution to the war in Afghanistan. From 2006 to 2011, it maintained an average of over 2,000 combat troops in the volatile province of Kandahar – the fourth largest contingent in the U.S.- led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF ). This may strike as odd given that Canada suffered the third highest death toll per capita after Denmark and the UK (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2011, 509; Saideman 2012, 8), and extended twice the mandate of its combat troops in Kandahar despite a mean public support to the war of merely 40 percent (Kreps 2010, 195). What accounted for the Canadian government’s decision to maintain its combat presence in Kandahar despite declining public support? After arguing the indeterminacy of system-level determinants, this chapter contends that key domestic factors played a decisive role in driving Canada to overcontribute in the Afghan War. More specifically, an Atlanticist strategic culture and the use of strategic narratives respectively help make sense of Canadian decision-makers’ desire and capacity to impose their will to a critical public. I argue that it is the solidity of the elite consensus on Canada’s Atlanticist security policy rather than the effectiveness of the government’s strategic narratives that best account for its ability to maintain a sizable military commitment to the Afghan mission.
