ABSTRACT
This chapter studies the most important historical instances of the delegation and non-delegation of tasks to the Commission in the realm of foreign policy in order to shed a light on the underlying rationales of the Member States. The research agenda on delegation in the EU is substantial. Yet like in much of the rest of social science, there is an ontological split between explanations based on rationalism and those based on constructivism. The most prominent rationalist explanation behind the delegation of powers to supranational institutions in the EU, such as the Commission, is that they improve the credibility of commitments. Another reason for delegating tasks is to increase the efficiency of policy-making. Having a chairmanship that presides over the deliberations is an obvious example. The constructivist explanation of mimetic isomorphism, in contrast, holds more explanatory power. Finally post-delegation, the self-restraint within the Commission on the extent to which it should play a role in foreign policy proper is interesting.
