ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the obvious asymmetries in the capacities of different social forces to interpret the multiple crises affecting the European Union and to translate their construals into national and/or supranational responses to these crises. Drawing on cultural political economy, we relate this to the interaction of meaning-making and structuration in reducing the complexity of the world as a condition for ‘going on’ in it – specifically, in the following analysis, as a basis for addressing these crises. In this regard we focus on two aspects of the capacities of social forces that, together, shape crisis interpretations as well efforts to manage the crisis in terms of such construals. The first aspect is interpretive power (Deutungshoheit), which refers in the present context to differences in the factual ability of social forces to construe the objective character and significance of a crisis and to translate their construals into policies intended to manage and resolve the crisis, whether or not these prove successful. This is not so much a question of having the best scientific analyses and most persuasive arguments as it is a question of having the capacities to act upon a given interpretation, which also involves access to key decision-making structures, the availability of appropriate governmental technologies and the ability to mobilize sufficient support to make a difference in a particular conjuncture. The second aspect is narrower in scope but perhaps more significant in practice, namely, interpretive authority (Deutungsmacht). This refers to the legal instance or authority that has the legal right to interpret the law in a given juridico-political framework. This authority is crucial whenever it comes to interpretations that lead to the declaration of a state of economic emergency and authorization of exceptional crisis-management measures. We indicate below how interpretive power and authority have been coupled in shaping economic crisis responses in the European Union since the eruption of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis. Indeed, we show that certain crisis construals are only as good as the means available to authorize their translation into policy and the strategic selectivities and balances of forces that shape this process.
