ABSTRACT
Miller’s (2010) framework regarding transition to peace presents four broad strategies, distinguishing between realist strategies to achieve cold peace, and liberal strategies that may lead to warm peace. Among the main strategies Miller discusses under the rubric of “defensive liberalism” is the strategy of commercial liberalism. This strategy, often seen as the hallmark of the pacification of Western Europe after WWII, has been put forth by both local and international actors as a promising avenue to promote transition to peace between Israel and the Palestinians. This chapter focuses on the attempts to apply economic means to promote peace in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It distinguishes between two related, yet distinct economic strategies – “Commercial Peace” and “Capitalist Peace”. It then examines the unique implications of the asymmetric nature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (both power asymmetry and actor asymmetry) for the ability to use these strategies. In this respect, we also question to what extent these so-called liberal strategies are indeed liberal, by surveying the obstacles of employing liberal strategies in an illiberal environment. Economic liberal strategies were used successfully in postwar Western Europe, but the pre-conditions for their success, namely relatively moderate economic power disparities, existence of sovereign states with sufficient economic infrastructure, and a relatively stable security environment, are missing in the Israeli–Palestinian case. In the chapter, we focus on these pre-conditions and their importance.
