ABSTRACT
Surprise is regarded by many theorists as an emotion that serves important adaptive functions (e.g., Charlesworth, 1969; Darwin, 1965; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1977; Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; Plutchik, 1980; Ribot, 1896; Shand, 1920; Stanley, 1895; Tomkins, 1962). Like all emotions, surprise has a conscious or subjective aspect. This aspect manifests itself in two properties that seem to be central for conscious states generally: phenomenal character and immediate awareness (e.g., Smith, 1989). On the one hand, it is like something to be surprised (Nagel, 1974) or, as emotion psychologists usually say, it feels in a particular way to be surprised. On the other hand, one is immediately aware of one’s surprise experience; that is, one is—in a nonfocal, prereflective way—aware of one’s experience without, apparently, having to draw any inferences (Smith, 1989; see also Rosenthal, 1986, 1993). 1
