ABSTRACT
When we think about and interact with members of different social groups, we are likely to experience both intellectual and emotional reactions. In recent years, an explosion of research on the topic of stereotyping has examined the cognitive dynamics of our intellectual, belief-based reactions to social groups (for recent reviews, see Fiske, 1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, in press). In contrast, relatively less attention has been directed at the nature of affective intergroup reactions, or to the interplay between perceivers’ cognitive and affective reactions. As the other chapters in this volume attest, it has become increasingly evident in recent years that an understanding of the nature of social judgment and behavior requires us to look beyond consciously articulated intellectual beliefs to the subjective states that form the context for thought and action. Affective reactions constitute perhaps the most pervasive and important class of subjective experiences. As important as stereotypes may be in shaping the nature of intergroup perception and behavior, it is the feeling states that arise in the presence of members of stereotyped groups that provide the background tone for all intergroup interactions. Understanding the role played by these subjective states is no longer an issue that can be kept on the back burner. No theory can hope to provide a realistic, complete conceptualization of intergroup relations without giving prominent attention to the way we feel about the members of other groups.
