ABSTRACT
Taking DST (dynamical systems theory) resources as a conceptual framework for thinking about dynamical systems transforms numerical complexities into conceptual deliberations, and consequently greatly facilitates embodied cognitive science (Clark 1997, 1999, 2001). In fact, some dynamicists, such as Thelen & Smith (1994), Thelen (1995) and van Gelder (1998), worked at this conceptual level. However, the management of those conceptual resources may risk floating away from the anchor of the DST-based equation-governed modeling. This may, at least, incur three mis-implications, as this paper aims to uncover. Firstly, conceiving of cognitive systems on the grounds of DST resources, surprisingly, does not warrant a DST- based underlying mechanism. Secondly, inference across the DST resources may be a mistake. Lastly, the entitlement of a ‘dynamical system’ on grounds of DST resources may direct our attention to various troubling ambiguities of that term. Therefore, before all those risks are avoided, DST resources would not be safely useful as tools.
