ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses on the possibility that cognitive representations may change very rapidly, or that a process commonly called insight may be psychologically and biologically plausible. It first reviews the metacognitive data. Feeling-of-knowing data comparing people's predictions during memory retrieval and insight problem solving, and the dynamics of people's knowledge about their own proximity to solution are outlined. Second, the literature on the capabilities of amnesic patients is reviewed. Amnesiacs show severe memory dysfunctions. If insight problem solving depends critically on memory, amnesiacs should also be severely impaired on these problems. Third, it is shown that the memory-retrievalonly view of insight problem solving runs headlong into Menon's paradox, including the infinite regress it implies. Finally, the chapter concludes that to accept the recommendation to abandon the concept of insight problem solving on the grounds that it is unscientific entails a high risk of throwing out the pearl with the oyster.
