ABSTRACT
The degree, and causes, of normative order in the timing of psychological change across the adult life span is a matter of continuing debate. The essential dimension of the debate may be defined, at its opposite ends, by universal structure versus open-endedness with respect to the timings of psychological changes (e.g., developmental stages) during adulthood (Brim & Ryff, 1980; Gergen, 1980). Most visibly representing the former position has been Levinson (1978, 1986), who argued for a progression of “periods” alternating between change and stability in the “life structure,” with said periods sharply and consistently demarcated by chronological age (Erikson, 1963; Gould, 1978). The other end of the debate may be best summarized by what Gergen (1980) has called the “aleatoric” perspective; that is, the view that the adult life course is highly flexible, context-bound, and essentially unpredictable with respect to a host of alternative pathways and possible psychological changes.
