ABSTRACT
We turn now to more particular matters—to a discussion of the Constitutional Commission which the N.L.C. established in September 1966 as part of its attempt to turn the military power it had unlawfully acquired into some more permanent structure of civilian authority. The constitution which resulted from the Commission did not stand the test of time, being swept away by the second coup. But although no more than a paper tiger, it exemplified in a very interesting way the tensions which necessarily exist (particularly in post-colonial states) between political intentions and actual achievement. There were also specific problems encountered by Dr. Busia's government which flowed directly from the document itself, and from the intentions of those who made it—not least the assumption that every possible danger to a future civilian regime could actually be provided against. Hence the very detailed clauses of the 1969 constitution which were as unrealistic as they were undemocratic in the battery of prohibitions they placed in the way of a future elected government. The temptation to bend or disregard such rules was likely to beset any government having to act within them, and Dr. Busia's administration was to show itself unable to resist such temptations. There was, in addition, a more general problem of trust since the division of functions among a number of constitutionally protected ‘guardians’, and the pluralist image of a society composed of autonomous social estates such as the military, the chiefs and the professions, caused many to believe that the Constitution had been fashioned in defence of privilege rather than ‘in defence of democracy’, as the third Article of the Commissioners’ Draft attempted to proclaim. 1
