ABSTRACT
Adolf Reinach believed the enormous disparity in the sentences masked what he called 'remarkable antinomies' in our understanding of deliberation. So Aristotle's example seems to confirm Reinach's fourth proposition that the meritorious action is less meritorious when done after deliberation-that person is less brave-but it seems at the same time to disconfirm the third. On Cooper's view of Aristotle, therefore, practical reason involves an already gained knowledge of reasons determining our sense of specific actions appropriate to different kinds of situations. Shouting behavior is inconsistent with what the nature of conversation entails; it subverts what the author understands the ends of conversation to be and achieves no good purpose in the context he has described. Finally, they have noted that Reinach's so-called antinomies apply only in cases of occurrent deliberation. And they have given an account of how a prior, non-occurrent deliberation can illuminate what the author took to be the falsity of Reinach's third proposition.
