ABSTRACT
Timing is not everything, however. Timing is something that we can see and measure. Human action and conscious experience are characterized by an intrinsic temporality that involves both anticipatory processes and retentional processes. Both human experience and human action are characterized by a ubiquitous intrinsic temporality. As we saw, the protention-primal impression-retention model applies to action and non-conscious motor processes as well as to consciousness. Intentional action often involves prior intentions, and these may involve conscious and thoughtful deliberations about what to do and what goals to aim at. Developmental science traditionally held that postural schemas are absent at birth and that their development depends on prolonged experience. Berthoz suggests that the Husserlian analysis of the retentional-protentional structure of experience is a model that also works for the processes involved in motor control. That the dynamical analyses offered by Varela and others are not a perfect fit for Husserl's analysis of temporality was critically pointed out by Rick Grush.
