ABSTRACT
In his recent article supporting the policy of reverse discrimination, Paul W. Taylor (“Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice” [chapter 4]) argued, roughly, that when a certain group of persons within a given society is discriminated against because of some nonmoral characteristic (e.g., skin color), and such discrimination is essentially tied to a pervasive social practice, the characteristic upon which the discrimination is based takes on a moral quality; consequently it becomes the moral duty of the society to make reparation to that group. Although I find it difficult to disagree with the allegation that in some sense institutionalized injustice demands institutionalized compensation, I think that Taylor's argument contains two fundamental flaws. First, he has not concerned himself with the task of making reasonably clear some of the essential terms he employs—among them “institutionalized injustice” and “institutionalized compensation.” Second, a consistent application of his thesis to a given society is more likely to perpetuate than eliminate the injustices of discrimination.
