ABSTRACT

The discussion occasioned by my note “Discrimination and Morally Relevant Characteristics” has helped to clarify some of the available positions on the justification of special benefits for victims of discrimination. J. L. Cowan (“Inverse Discrimination”) agrees that the justification for special help lies in the fact that one has been wronged, not in the fact, say, that one is black. But he thinks that it is important to emphasize that the special benefits which are due to many blacks are due only because they are individuals who have been wronged, not because of any fact relating to their race. In his view, “reparations for blacks” must be understood as “reparations for wronged individuals who happen to be black.” P. W. Taylor and M. D. Bayles criticize my approach from the opposite direction. They think that my approach pays insufficient attention to the moral status of wronged groups. In what follows I shall attempt to point out some weaknesses in my critics’ positions and to elaborate further my own.