ABSTRACT
In a well-known passage of his Preface to the 2nd edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz Russell accuses Leibniz of having two philosophies, ‘a good philosophy which (after Arnauld’s criticisms) he kept to himself and ‘a bad philosophy which he published with a view to fame and money’. The accusation is elaborated throughout the book as well as in the chapter on Leibniz in the History of Western Philosophy and in the third part of The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. 1 It seems to me wholly unjust and, in so far as it is based on Russell’s exegesis and criticisms of Leibniz’s philosophical writings, to rest on certain preconceptions about logic, metaphysics and their interconnection which are mistaken or, at least, controversial and capable of rejection by perfectly competent and honest philosophers. It is the purpose of this chapter to uncover some of these preconceptions in Russell’s interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy and by critically examining them to make room for their replacement by altogether different theses. If the critical examination is sound, then it destroys or greatly weakens the force of Russell’s philosophical testimony in support of the dishonesty charge. The temptation to show this in detail as well as the temptation to rebut some of Russell’s non-philosophical evidence will, however, be resisted.
