ABSTRACT
(1) Both by the choice of its subject and by its mode of discussion, Russell’s essay ‘On Denoting’ 1 has remained one of the conspicuously influential philosophical papers of this century. Yet its main thesis has not found universal acceptance. The details of Russell’s solution of the problem of descriptions are well known and need not be repeated. Here I wish to recall only that Russell rejected the notion that a description is a name. The following argument is given in Principia Mathematica in support of this view: 2
For if that were the meaning of ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ [i.e. that ‘Scott’ and ‘the author of Waverley’ are two names for the same object], what would be required for its truth would be that Scott should have been called the author of Waverley. if he had been so called, the proposition would be true, even if someone else had written Waverley; while if no one called him so, the proposition would be false, even if he had written Waverley.
