ABSTRACT
Important element in the philosophical background to the idea of pluralism is the Kantian distinction between the content of experiences and the conceptual schemes, in order to organise and make sense of the experiences; or the doctrine of scheme content dualism (SC). The onslaught on the very idea of conceptual schemes has been spearheaded by Donald Davidson, with Richard Rorty bringing up the rear. Empiricism can be formulated either as a theory about mental content, in this sense it is also presented as a theory of truth or it may be seen as a theory of knowledge, justification and evidence. Each of these formulations carries a philosophical baggage that has proved unpopular with a number of contemporary philosophers, including Hilary Putnam, Rorty and John McDowell, as well as Davidson. One philosophical consequence of this rather minimal claim is the notorious distinction between analytic/synthetic statements, or the first dogma of empiricism.
