ABSTRACT

38. It is said that if an AE wants to stay in the same place and in order to do so has to transfer to a separate Circle, he sometimes has to pay the SE of his own Circle, especially if it is an O & M Circle, for release.39. They can appeal to the Administrative Tribunal, to which all service disputes relating to government employees may be referred; but the procedure is bothersome and the Tribunal’s decision is not binding on the government, so it is little used by irrigation staff.40. ‘In the Food for Work programmes, inflated muster rolls with fictitious names, utilisation of foodgrain for purchase of crockery and furniture and upkeep of government buildings have come to light’ [Krishnaswamy, 1980].41. The three Supervisors who came in the first half of 1981 all reputedly had to pay this amount.42. Well over 100 AEs found themselves having to take compulsory one-month holidays in order to share out the shortfall of posts, and presumably (since the normal ratio of Supervisors to AEs is 4:1) well over 400 Supervisors. Occasional imbalances between the supply and demand for staff must be normal in any big construction organisation, and one wonders how they are handled in irrigation departments elsewhere in the world.43. Hence farmers commonly do not want gates on their sluices, because if the sluices are ungated it is more difficult for the staff to cut ofT their water. On the other hand, farmers in tail-end locations do want upstream sluices to be gated, so that they can be closed and more water sent down to them. This sort of divergence between what irrigators want for themselves and what they want for the rest of the system is a fundamental feature of canal irrigation.44. One has sympathy where the farmers could grow some crop other than paddy. But in some areas which are not zoned for paddy the land is too saturated by seepage from the canal, or from (zoned) paddy areas higher up, to grow any other crop; which reflects poor zoning, and failure to provide adequate drainage. In this case the engineers have much less justification.45. A few engineers who reach SE or CE rank still find intolerable the pressures to be corrupt, to do a mediocre job and to keep quiet in the face of wrongdoing, and simply retire early. One SE appointed to a big new World Bank-aided project was appalled at the poor standard of design and construction, and said openly at meetings of engineers and senior government officials that if the minor distributories had been properly designed and constructed in the first place, the large amounts now having to be spent to upgrade them would have been unnecessary. He was harrassed so fiercely by his colleagues (it is said) that he retired early. I know at least one CE who did the same, for similar reasons. Both men were outstandingly talented and dynamic, and one suspects such people are more likely to take this course, depleting the Irrigation Department of a potential internal constituency for reform.46. Collectors average less than two years in a place before being transferred. A correspondent, chiding me for not giving the Collector a central place in the checking mechanism, writes:It is the Collector that would normally be expected to control the system. In some states he is very, very powerful-for instance in Maharashtra. It seems to me that his interests are overwhelmingly in not letting corruption get out of hand; the risk to him, if he is seen to knave at it, is enormous [loss of career and disgrace], and the gains from taking bribes himself are relatively small in this light.This is not my impression for the area I know; especially because of the distinction between what the Collector’s interests are, and what he is able to do.47. Betterment Levy is a levy on the increase in land values which the bringing of land under command is expected to result in.48. This difference in the ‘partial equilibrium’ and ‘general equilibrium’ effects of the corrupt system in irrigation is similar to the probable effects o f ‘speed money’ in the bureaucracy as a whole. Speed money, if common, probably has the effect of slowing down the overall work performance of the bureaucracy, as officials cut back their work effort in order to invite the payment of bribes, by means of which individuals are able to accelerate officials’ effort from this reduced level to deal with their particular cases.49. This holds because the higher taxes would likely fall on items of mass consumption, while bribery and extortion payments come disproportionately from the landed.50. An agricultural economist with detailed knowledge of a large irrigation canal m the uplands of another southern state, to whom I put questions similar to those addressed in this paper, replied as follows: