ABSTRACT
It is taken for granted, and with good reason, that astronomers, biologists, physicists, historians and so on possess a great deal of factual knowledge which other people do not possess. And it is possible to delimit with sufficient clarity the special field of knowledge of, for example, the astronomer or the historian. But it is not at all so clear what it is that the philosopher as philosopher knows or can know. Is it possible for him by philosophical reflection to attain factual knowledge about reality? 1 If so, are the propositions in which this knowledge is expressed capable of imparting fresh information about reality to at least some people? Or are they simply and always pompous ways of saying what everyone already knows? In the latter case we should have to say that the philosopher, unlike the astronomer, cannot increase our factual knowledge of reality. And we might then be inclined to say that philosophical knowledge, provided that we are willing to admit that there is such a thing, is concerned with the meaning of terms and propositions. Here, we may think, we are on safe ground. Even though we may abandon all claims that the philosopher can increase our factual knowledge about things, we can at least maintain the claim that he is capable of increasing our knowledge about the meaning of terms and propositions. ‘Speculative’ philosophy having been rejected, logical analysis or analysis of language still remains, and it is capable of resulting in what can properly be called philosophical knowledge.
