ABSTRACT
The temptation in point appears to owe its life to two main considerations. Malcolm, who unlike most philosophers has gone to the trouble of discussing this question at some length, Norman Malcolm, Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Philosophical Review, seems to provide two rather different interpretations of this infallibility. It is clear, then, that the Wittgenstein-Malcolm criteriological argument for the infallibility of first-ever psychological utterances requires considerable revisionindeed, like the pain-behaviour argument, it clearly fails to show that there is anything intrinsically incorrigible about such utterances. According to one interpretation, a person's words about his present sensations have the same logical status as his cries and facial expressions. If one is prepared to do this, if one's wiring diagram has been properly shaped by training and experience, one is then a conscious agent, a creature capable of making self-conscious avowals, of making moves in the normative activity of reasoning and speaking.
